Much, and some would say already too much, has been written on the relationship of philosophy, theology and religion. At the risk of repeating hackneyed commonplaces, let me begin by simply stating that there is a profound and almost necessary symbiotic relationship between philosophy and theology (their important internal differences notwithstanding) on the one hand, and
stage of our cultural evolution we cannot envisage, let alone communicate and discourse about, religion op god without that kind of disciplined thinking that also includes philosophy of contemporary ecumenical activity to the history of religions seems to lie in the fact that the intense conversation between members of different cultural and religious traditions renders all parties to the dialogue more alert to the profit to be derived from the presence of spokesmen from a variety of backgrounds. It is a happy omen if philosophers and theologians, instead of being paralysed by the fear of "relativism,1 1 evince a readiness to be liberated from the incestuous atmosphere of in-group thinking. The
Comparative Religionist (which is another neobarbarian shorthand term designating people whose professional avocation is the comparative study of religions) on his part very definitely needs the theologians and philosophers since they, among others, provide much of his raw-material, his bread-and-butter as it were. Without them he would have much less material to work on, much as a historian of art would be out of work if there were no painters and sculptors.
Now it is part of the human situation that every activity takes place in a historico-cultural context and not in a vacuum. For example, the fact that a conference on religion takes place in the Western hemisphere-intellectually and not merely geograph ically-already pre-empts the nature of its deliberations. And the same could, of course, be said of meetings held in Varanasi or Madras or Ise. I am reminded here of an ecumenical-type con ference that took place in Japan several years ago at the initia tive of leading Shinto circles. The conference had as its theme the ethical concerns which world religions shared, or should share, in our present perilous situation. In other words the organisers, rightly or wrongly, felt that it was safer to talk about the ethical implications of religious commitments rather than to skate on the thin ice of !,god talk.1 1 In fact, the concept of god still seems to many to be a hot potato, to be hastily dropped or altogether avoided. Hence one feels all the more respect for those who have the courage to take the bull by the horns, as e.g. the recent Nanzan symposium on Shinto and Christianity.
When referring to discussions about god I do not, of course, have in mind the popular fads of some years ago when pseudo-theological journalism made easy money by substituting an enviable public relations flare for intellectual seriousness, and producing books by the dozen on the "Death of God" and the like.
The subject is too silly to deserve serious attention，except by sociologists whose job it is to study the history of cultural fads.
The really fascinating aspect of this rather funny interlude was the infantile revolutionary pathos with which some self-ordained high-priests of secularity proclaimed the death-of-god with a fervour that exhibited all the symptoms of intense euphoria, and in a curious academica-theological liturgy that has been aptly described as the pop-style of a "happening."
Let us, at this stage, remind ourselves that parallel to the over against religions the category of religion (or some better and nobler term) is gaining ground. We even encounter with increasing frequency the incredible word "religionists," presumably signifying the adherents of specific historic religions. On the lowest and most stupid level this usage is also due to a vague, though sometimes also pretty explicit, feeling that "religionists" should close ranks against the children of darkness i.e., the threatening forces of atheism, secularism, materialism, mindless scientism etc.
Of course in reality things are not all that simple. Some religious spokesmen glory very articulately in the material and/or secular
Whatrs in a Name dimensions of religion. But there is also a new and urgent sense of a common and shared responsibility for whatever dimensions of spirituality attach to the human condition. If it is not a matter of defending God (I am alluding to the title of a thought-provoking paper by Professor Frederick Sontag "The Defence of God"), it is certainly a matter of defending for, and within, the reality of our lives whatever the cipher ngod" stands for. The possibility that this cipher might acquire meaning only in the actual reality of religious life and not in rational discourse is part of the problem.
As a very religious ancient pagan philosopher once put it: "God, if you talk about him without virtue, is merely a word" (Plotinus).
The second point that deserves attention could be described as Polytheistic discourse had become meaningless because, among other things, it was too anthropomorphic and, more decisively, it reflected a fragmented rather than unified view of the cosmos.
Only a uniquely one god can be uniquely god, let alone transcendent. Nevertheless, also monotheistic discourse remains incurably, though perhaps more subtly, anthropomorphic. I am not speaking here of those critics, ancient and modern, the ancestors and descendants of Feuerbach as it were, who thought to discredit god by reducing him to a projection of ourselves. These good people no doubt had the merit of being more frankly outspoken and less gullible than the superclever modern theologians for whom god (or Christ in lieu of god) is a name for our existential predicaments, viz. for our imagined answer to them. Buddhists are more consistent in that respect. Also theists are well aware that no matter how transcendent, how absolute, how "wholly other"
that which they call god may be (even if they smuggle in some The second question relates to the legitimacy of language, the woeful but inevitable inadequacy of which is generally recognised. according to criteria that have to be determined. To give but one, rather simplistic, example. For many centuries certain religions held the symbolic expression "Our Father" to be more adequate and legitimate than "Our Mother•" (I need not make a show here of the kind of irrelevant though fashionable pseudo-scholarship which proves with the help of quotations from church fathers, medieval mystics and other sources which we all knew by heart already at nursery school that things are a little more complex). Perhaps some time in the future this symbolic idiom will change. I advisedly say some time in the future, because this type of change is generally brought about by gestation and growth rather than by shrill and strident rhetoric which, in spite of its name, is anything Religion may be suspicious, with good reason, of rationalist intellectualism. But it will agree with philosophy that without disciplined thinking there can be no integrity, let alone religious integrity. The foundress of Tenri-kyo was both human and divine, and hence the relation between these two aspects requires clarification. Reading the modern Tenri theologians one has the eerie feeling of rereading, in a somewhat different key, the early church fathers up to Chalcedon on the humanity and divinity of Christ. Plus que ca change, plus c!est la meme chose.
